

25X1



7 September 1960

25X1


Copy No. C 75

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 6
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
IS APPROVED TO
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S P
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: MR. 102
10 JUN 1980
DAYS: REVIEWED:

25X1



25X1

State Dept. review completed

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

7 SEPTEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Discontent in South Vietnam could erupt in antigovernment demonstrations; army's willingness to suppress non-Communist opposition elements could quickly change if this involved considerable bloodshed.

(1)

III. THE WEST

Argentina considering breaking relations with Cuba.

(2)



LATE ITEMS

Situation in Laos.

(3)

Situation in the Congo.

(4)



Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

South Vietnam: [Discontent among labor, student, and refugee circles in South Vietnam could erupt in antigovernment demonstrations, the American Embassy in Saigon reports. The embassy believes that if such demonstrations break out, the Communists will attempt to manipulate them from behind the scenes or engage in hit-and-run acts of violence. Security police and military forces reportedly have plans to smother any demonstration before it can gain momentum, but the army's willingness to suppress non-Communist opposition elements might quickly change if this involved considerable bloodshed.]

25X1

III. THE WEST

Cuba-Argentina: Argentina is considering breaking relations with Cuba as a result of Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's vituperative attacks on Argentina's position at the OAS meeting in San Jose and his public vilification of President Frondizi. On 5 September Roa rejected Argentina's diplomatic protest of these attacks, as well as a similar Brazilian protest against his somewhat milder attacks on Brazilian Foreign Minister Lafer. Earlier strains in Argentine-Cuban relations, such as those caused by Cuban radio attacks and Cuba's misuse of its diplomatic pouch, had been smoothed over, but Argentina will find it more difficult to maintain a conciliatory attitude in the face of the present provocation.

OK

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

25X1

LATE ITEMS

*Laos: Premier Souvanna Phouma has told the American Ambassador that he is prepared to dismiss General Phoumi from the government as a rebel if Phoumi refuses to come to Vientiane. Souvanna claims Phoumi has no reason to fear for his personal safety if he returns, although Kong Le apparently still retains effective control of the capital and Pathet Lao influence in the evolving situation is becoming more pronounced. If Phoumi should decide to assume his post in the government, the Pathet Lao may react by stepping up guerrilla activities. Souvanna is considering certain concessions to the Pathets' demands, including partial new elections and recognition of the USSR.

OK

25X1

*Situation in Congo as of 0300 EDT: President Kasavubu's coup of 5 September against Premier Lumumba has failed, according to the American consul in Brazzaville, and Kasavubu is now in his own house under UN guard. The cabinet, supporting Premier Lumumba, has decided that Kasavubu should be tried for high treason. Lumumba apparently controls all important facilities in the capital except for the airport and radio station which are in UN hands and at present inoperative for all except UN business. The premier has protested UN closure of the radio station. This UN action, along with Lumumba's expected criticism of the UN's role during the coup effort, may lead to a considerable heightening of tension between Lumumba and the UN officials in the Congo.

OK

Lumumba-controlled police broke up a demonstration of several thousand Kasavubu supporters with gun fire in the only major incident of violence following the coup. Most political parties appear to be adopting a wait-and-see attitude, but as anticipated, President Tshombé of Katanga, Kasavubu's Abako organization, Kalonji's group and the PUNA organization of previously-arrested Bolikango have promised their support to Kasavubu.

25X1

7 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

11

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

25X1

Possibility of Antigovernment Demonstrations in South Vietnam

The uneasy political atmosphere in Saigon resulting both from stepped-up Communist guerrilla activities in the countryside and dissatisfaction in certain circles over the government's authoritarian rule could erupt in antigovernment demonstrations, according to the American Embassy. An abortive effort to organize demonstrations reportedly was initiated in connection with the 19 August anniversary of the Viet Minh independence proclamation, and some 30 arrests were reported of persons carrying arms, explosives, and handbills.

Opposition elements have recently attempted to stir up the apolitical student elements as well as certain refugee and labor circles to demand policy changes. The trade unions are the best organized group, and their economic and social grievances make them the most likely vehicle for any public demonstrations. The embassy speculates that, should such demonstrations occur, the Communists would attempt to manipulate them behind the scenes and to engage in hit-and-run acts of violence.

Government security forces reportedly have plans to smother any demonstration before it can gain momentum, and there are enough army and civil guard units in the immediate Saigon area to control any outbreaks. These forces are anti-Communist and loyal to President Diem, but it is questionable whether military leaders would support any bloody repression of non-Communist elements.

25X1

25X1

Situation in Congo

President Kasavubu apparently has failed in his coup attempt against Premier Lumumba who controls all of Leopoldville except for the UN-guarded airports and radio station. The UN has taken complete control of both airports near Leopoldville and placed debris on the runway to prevent Soviet planes from taking more Congolese troops to the Kasai area. UN forces have shut down the radio station to prevent Lumumba's inflammatory propaganda broadcasts. This action, however, has been protested by Lumumba and may cause an early showdown between the premier and the UN. UN officials insist that they are not taking sides--merely maintaining order--and on 6 September in New York refused to say which government was recognized by the UN.

Lumumba has received cabinet backing against Kasavubu. The cabinet on 6 September decided Kasavubu should be tried for high treason for trying to remove the premier and thus automatically was ineligible to continue his constitutional functions. While awaiting parliamentary approval, the cabinet took over the president's powers. In its communique, the cabinet called upon all nations to refuse backing to the opposition. Already Moscow radio and the pro-government Ghana press have attacked Kasavubu, the latter saying he had been "seduced by the imperialists." Early in his coup attempt, Kasavubu asked the UN to take over control of the Congo, but a UN spokesman indicated it would need a new mandate to comply.

Lumumba's control of the police was indicated on 6 September when they used gunfire to break up a pro-Kasavubu demonstration. The political party of leftist deputy premier Gizenga has rallied to his support, but most parties are maintaining a wait-and-see attitude. As anticipated, however, factions opposed to Lumumba's highly centralized control have quickly announced support of Kasavubu. Their strength may be indicated shortly when the Congo parliament meets in response to the premier's summons for an emergency session and a vote of confidence. It will probably be difficult for the opposition factions to gain the two-thirds majority in each house necessary to remove the premier legally. Even if they fail, however, Lumumba's weakness in the Senate may induce him to disregard further parliamentary procedures.

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

President Tshombé of Katanga quickly backed Kasavubu's actions as "perfectly constitutional" and sent an appeal for a national conference to draw up a new, and federal, constitution. Meanwhile, Katanga is giving attention to its air defense. According to the Belgian commander of the Katanga Air Force, Tshombé now has 15 pilots and 24 maintenance personnel. The commander hopes that by November, Katanga will have six armed aircraft, five C-47's suitable for paratroop operations and 10 European pilots. The ground forces reportedly have ample small arms and automatic weapons, but some of Tshombé's European advisors are pessimistic of receiving aid in time to offset Communist aid to Lumumba's forces.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

7 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300060001-6

TOP SECRET